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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
The National Psychological Association For Psychoanalysis, Inc., however,
couched their objection in constitutional terms and attacked the validity of the
statute on the ground that it did not contain a formal definition of "psycho-
logist" and hence was violative of due process in that it arbitrarily restricted
the carrying on of a lawful occupation by proscribing a non-certified psycho-
logist from describing his professional services truthfully. Similarly, they
argued that the statute's qualifying standards are meaningless without a defini-
tion to which they can attach and hence the statute unlawfully delegates
legislative power without accompanying standards to guide the exercise of
administrative discretion.
The Court of Appeals quickly dismissed the arguments by noting that the
only thing proscribed was the use of specific words by non-certificants to de-
scribe the rendition of psychological services without in any manner proscrib-
ing the services themselves. Moreover, despite the relative, impossibility of
agreeing on a definition of modem psychology, for all practical purposes the
term "psychologist" is defined as one who meets the standards set up by the
statute.59
Inconsistent with its own motion for summary judgment, plaintiff, on
appeal, objected to the determination of a. constitutional issue without a trial.
The Court summarily dealt with his objection by pointing out that there were
no issues of fact in this case; and a pure issue of law, even though it be consti-
tutional law, can be dealt with by a motion for summary judgment.
The instant case represents no enlargement or retrogression from the
established law of this state. It does however point up the power of the Legis-
lature to protect the public while still interfering to only a minimal degree with
the practice of a profession through the use of certifying laws rather than
licensing laws.60
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Prior to the Russian Revolution, the world wide membership of the
Russian Orthodox Church recognized the Patriarch of Moscow as its spiritual
and administrative head. The revolution resulted in the Church of Moscow
becoming subject to the Communist party. After ffiuch hesitation and con-
fusion, in 1924, because of this political interference, the North American
Diocese declared itself administratively independent of the Patriarch of Mos-
cow, with the right to elect its own bishops, rather than having them appointed
in Moscow. In 1945, the North American Diocese instituted an action to gain
59. N.Y. Education Law § 7605.
60. An interesting provision of the statute which was not under attack in this case
is § 7611 which reads as follows:
The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist registered
under provisions of this act and his client are placed on the same basis as those
provided by law between attorney and client, and nothing in this article shall be
construed to require any such privileged communications to be disclosed.
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possession of the Saint Nicholas Cathedral from the representative of the
Moscow Church who was then in possession of it.
This action had two phases. In each phase, the United States Supreme
Court\reversed the New York Court of Appeals, which, in each case, had
granted possession of the Cathedral to the North American Diocese. The
present case of Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik0' constitutes the second
portion of this action. Before this second case can be understood, however,
the first must be briefly summarized.
Shortly before the original commencement of this action in 1945, the
Legislature enacted Article 5-c (Sections 105 and 107) of the Religious Cor-
porations Law. The object of this legislation was to grant control and posses-
sion of the Cathedral to the North American Diocese because the representative
of the Moscow Church was felt to be virtually an agent of the Communist
Party. On the basis of this legislation, the Court of Appeals held in favor of
the North American Diocese in the case of Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Ked-
rofft . 2 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, however, this decision
was reversed on the ground that this statute violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.63 The Supreme Court stated: "We conclude that Article 5-c undertook
by its terms to transfer the control of the New York churches of the Russian
Orthodox religion from the central governing hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox
Church, the Patriarch of Moscow and the Holy Synod, to the governing authori-
ties of the Russian Church in America .... This transfer takes place by virtue
of the statute. Such a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment."64
The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to
dispose of it in a manner not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
Instead of returning possession of the Cathedral to the Moscow representative,
however, the Court of Appeals ordered that the case be tried anew as a case of
common law ejectment, holding that the Supreme Court's opinion applied only
to the statutory basis of the case. The Court of Appeals directed that the
issue to be tried was the domination of the Moscow Church by the Communist
Party. Thus, the second, and present phase of this case began.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as a matter of law
and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. 65 The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed, and once again granted control and possession of the
Cathedral to the North American Diocese.6  On the appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals was reversed for the second time.67
61. 7 N.Y.2d 191, 196 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959).
62. 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
63. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
64. Id. at 107.
65. 9 Misc. 2d 1069, 166 N.YS.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aft'd, 6 A.D.2d 866, 176
N.Y.S.2d 226 (1st Dep't 1958).
66. Supra note 61.
67. - US. - , 4 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1960).
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The rule was early established, by the case of Watson v. Jones,68 that
whenever a dispute arose within a denominational group, the decision of the
highest church authority to which this dispute was taken was binding on the
civil courts. Adherence to this rule in the present case would clearly result in
the Moscow representative retaining use and control of the Cathedral. The
Court of Appeals, however, held that this rule did not apply in this case because
the highest church authority was completely subservient to the Communist
Party. In its decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on a case of the
Sixth Circuit, the Romanian Orthodox Missionary Episcopate of America v.
Trutz, 9 which was, factually, almost identical to the present case. In the Trutz
case, the Romanian Orthodox Church of America declared itself autonomous
from the Church of Romania because of the latter's domination by the Com-
munists. The plaintiff, who claimed to be the duly appointed Bishop, by the
authorities of Romania, of the American Episcopate, sought equitable relief
to gain control of the assets of the American group. The Circuit Court affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint by the District Court, and certiorari was denied.
The use of this case by the Court of Appeals does not appear to be entirely
in error. In the first place, the Trutz case did reject the applicability of the
Watson rule because of the Communist domination of the Romanian authori-
ties. Secondly, the Circuit Court quoted with approval from the Kedroff case
as follows: "Freedom to select the clergy where no improper methods of choice
are proven . . . must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference. ' 70 Then the
Trutz Court added, "Since this is true as to protection against the interference
of an individual American state, we think it should be equally true as to
protection against the domination and interference of a foreign state." 71 The
logic of this statement has a ring of credulity, and the Court of Appeals quoted
this statement in its entirety.72 If the Circuit Court had said no more, the
reliance of the Court of Appeals on these words could not be criticized without
criticizing this statement itself in that it might fail to -recognize that the First
Amendment also prohibits any branch of the federal government from interfer-
ing in religious affairs. The Circuit Court did, however, go on to state as
follows: "The decision must in any case be affirmed upon the ground that the
plaintiff . . . has not borne the burden of proof in showing that he has .been
elected or consecrated as bishop of the Episcopate."7 3 Thus, the real basis for
the decision in Trutz case was the failure of the plaintiff to carry his burden of
proof, and the statement quoted by the Court of Appeals is little more than
a dictum.
68. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
69. 205 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1953).
70. Supra note 63 at 115.
71. Supra note 69 at 112.
72. Supra note 61 at 208, 196 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1959).
73. Supra note 69.
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In reversing New York's highest court, the Supreme Court cited the
case of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabanza,7 4 and held that regardless of whether a state
acts through its legislature (as in the first phase of this case), or through its
judiciary (as in the present phase), it is still the application of state power
to religious matters, and is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Those cases which are concerned only with whether a given action of a
state or the Federal government violates the Constitution are usually difficult
of decision. Therefore when a case is compounded by the entrance of a foreign
government into the picture (especially that of the Soviet Union) in addition
to a state or the Federal government, the decision is made even more difficult.
While the competing interests of this case, i.e., checking the influence of com-
munism on the one hand and preserving separation of church and state on the
other, may incline one to choose the former at the expense of the latter, the
correctness of the view taken by the Supreme Court is best expressed by Justice
Reed in the Kedroff case and by Chief Judge Desmond dissenting in the present
case.
Justice Reed stated that 'Legislative power to punish subversion cannot
be doubted. If such action should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither
his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense."75
In a parenthetical remark, Chief Judge Desmond said, "(Rejection by our
courts of the Patriarch's nominee for the archbishopric is the same kind of
interference with religion of which we accuse the Soviet authorities) .1
78
CONTRACTS
RECORDING REQUIREMENT OF AGREEMENTS INVOLVING MOTION PICTURE AND
ALLIED RIGHTS
A copyright may be assigned, conveyed, or mortgaged.1 Every assignment
of a copyright must be recorded in the United States Copyright Office. If an
assignment is not recorded, it is void as against a subsequent purchaser or
assignee who pays valuable consideration for the copyright without notice of
the first assignment.2 In the case of Vidor v. Serlin,3 the principal issue con-
fronting the Court of Appeals was whether the second assignment of a copy-
right, which had been recorded pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Section 28, took priority
over a previous agreement which had not been recorded. The trial court held
that the plaintiff, the subsequent assignee, was the sole and exclusive owner
74. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
75. Supra note 63 at 109.
76. Supra note 61 at 220, 196 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1959).
1. 17 U.S.C. § 28.
2. 17 u.S.C. § 30. See Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co., Inc. v. Social Uplift Film
Corp., 220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
3. 7 N.Y.2d 502, 199 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1960).
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